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Abstract
The German food retail sector and food manufacturers are in a state of transition due to a complex mix
of technological and market forces.  Competition continues to increase due to sluggish demand and
increasing consumer mobility.  The high degree of domestic and international concentration increases the
intensity of competition.  The top 20 food retailers obtain far more than two-thirds of total sales.  
Because of the increased competition among retailers, the number of retail stores will continue to
decline.   Food manufacturers fear the buying power of retailers in many ways.   Distrust and struggle
over the terms of trade characterize the relation between retailers and manufacturers.  ECR activities in
Germany lag behind relative to the US due to various cultural and procedural differences as well as
strategic reasons.   However, ECR provides a catalog of measures to achieve more efficiency and
customer focus.Working Paper 99-02
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The Grocery Retailing Sector in Germany:
ECR Activities in Comparison to the USA
Introduction
The food retail sector is most affected by the persistent weakness of economic activity in
Germany, mainly due to the decreasing purchasing power of consumers (Eschbach, 1997).  According
to A.C.  Nielsen, Germany=s grocery retailing sector again failed to increase its trading volume in 1997. 
Turnover (sales revenue) was at the same level as in 1996 (DM 192B or $111 billion).  According to
Nielsen, there were 70,400 stores in the country at the beginning of 1998: 1,900 fewer than the number
the previous year.  The decline is almost exclusively due to the shutdown of small stores less than 400
m
2 (˜ 4,300 sq. ft.) in size (Wendt, 1997).
The food industry faces a number of necessary adaptations to be realized and problems to be
tackled.  For a long time, no growth impulses have emanated from the demand side.  Only a few
product categories show an increase in per capita consumption.  The stagnant domestic demand was
not sufficiently compensated by export (also due to the crisis in Asia).  European integration continues
and the introduction of the Euro as a single currency facilitates international business activities. 
However, it will also involve temporary cost increases (Wendt and Höper, 1997).  The discussion
about concentration in the grocery retailing sector and its impact on agribusiness as a whole goes on
undiminished, and internationalization of trade in Europe increasingly has to be taken into account
(Wendt and Höper, 1997).
In this paper, we examine the opportunities that ECR can offer to the retail sector and the food
industry in Germany.  We look at the concentration process in Germany and internationally.  In this
context, we analyze the various forms of grocery retailing in Germany and assess their prospects for the
future.  The cost structure and performance of Germany=s food retail sector is examined in order to
draw conclusions about its efficiency.  Differences with the US market are pointed out and the resulting




In the last two decades, the German food retail sector has been shaped by increased
competition and constant change.  In 1980, the market share of the top three grocery retailers was
7.9%; 33.6% for the top 10 retailers (Lenel, 1997).  In 1997, the market share of the ten leading
retailers was 81.4%, with a turnover of DM 283B or $164B.  Meanwhile, 95.9% or almost the entire
turnover of the sector (DM 334B or $193B) is credited to the 30 largest retailers.
Table 1:  Top Five German Food Retailers and their Turnover (1997)
Rank Company / Group Turnover (BDM/B$)
1 Rewe Group, Cologne 37.4  / 21.6
2 Edeka / AVA Group, Hamburg 37.4  / 21.6
3 Aldi Group, Essen / Mühlheim 29.3  / 16.9
4 Metro Group, Cologne 28.2  / 16.3
5 Tengelmann Group, Mühlheim 19.0  / 10.9
  Source:  (DLG-Mitteilungen, 4/98)
At the present time, the high degree of concentration does not reduce the intensity of
competition (Lachner, 1996).  On the contrary, retailers compete fiercely for market shares, seemingly
for consumers= benefit.  However, one should not forget that such aggressive means can eventually
eliminate competitors increasing the market power of the remaining companies.  The speed of the
concentration process continues to increase due to the elimination of international trade barriers and the
international ambitions of leading retailers aiming at growth outside their saturated domestic markets. 
Clear strategies are vital for food retailers to maintain and strengthen their position in the domestic
market place (Campbell, 1996).
Reasons for domestic concentration are demand side pressure and increased consumer mobility.
 Sluggish demand has increased the competitive pressure on each company especially in the grocery
retailing sector.  Furthermore, the high costs of internal rationalization measures foster the concentration
process at the company level and affect the number of retail outlets (Poschacher, 1997).  The
geographic dimension of markets is affected by consumers' increased willingness and ability to travel3
considerable distances to shop.  This results in a disintegration of regional monopolies and intensified
competition.  Successful companies react to the changing demand side requirements using competitive
instruments (i.e. larger outlets, price reductions, favorable locations) in an effort to create, maintain or
even extend regional monopolies.  At the same time, it increases their capital requirements.  Smaller
companies lacking capital are no longer able to face competition and are eliminated from the regional
sub-market.  Thus, the number of retailers and the choices for consumers decline and the intensity of
competition is diminished (Schmidt, 1997).
Domestic concentration creates regional market structures with the danger of restricted
competition.  Matschuk and Vieth (1984) show that in grocery retailing the rates of return on sales and
on equity depend on company size, where medium-sized companies have a better return on sales and
equity than large companies.  In their opinion and contrary to the Antitrust Commission=s opinion, there
is a considerable threat to competition due to the high concentration resulting from mergers in the food
retail sector.  Empirical studies of the US grocery market also show a positive correlation between
concentration and price levels (Jammernegg, 1997).   In countries with a high level of concentration,
higher rates of return can be achieved which may explain the expansion of the German discounters into
these countries.
The concentration process in food retailing also leads to a considerable reduction in the number
of sales outlets which creates problems in the local supply situation.  Consumers often complain about a
decrease in supply alternatives.   Shopping possibilities for older and less mobile consumers are often
restricted.  As shopping centers are built in the suburbs, the demise of specialty shops and a loss of
inner city atmosphere ensue.  However, consumer behavior contributed to the concentration process.
Moreover, fewer jobs result from the declining numbers of small outlets in response to the
expansion of larger chain and discount stores.  Smaller stores are more labor-intensive than larger stores
based on self-service.  Statistics show that the number of employees in relation to average store selling
area has declined substantially.  Thus, the domestic concentration process results in a net job loss.  The
number of employees in food retailing continues to decline.  Moreover, synergy effects through mergers4
and rationalization measures have resulted in cuts of 71,000 jobs (or about 12%) between 1992 and
1997 (Gordian, 1996).
International Concentration
Internationalization in retailing has increased dramatically in the 1990s.  For instance, Wal-Mart
(USA) and Carrefour (France) are expanding in South America, Ahold (Netherlands) and Sainsbury
(UK) in the USA.  Aldi and Lidl (both German) expanded within Europe. International concentration is
the combined result of push and pull factors.  Push factors are sluggish demand, excess supply and
planning restrictions in the domestic markets.  Pull factors are marketing opportunities abroad, the
removal of international trade barriers, and the possibilities for cross-border mass advertising. 
Concentration takes places through elimination of competitors, branching out (internal growth) or take-
over of stores or entire chains (external growth), increasing the entrepreneurial performance.  Parallel to
the organizational concentration there have been far-reaching changes in the sales outlets, mainly due to
the introduction of self-service with larger selling areas and a rising capitalization while staffing
decreases.
The Frankfurt-based market research institute, M+M Eurodata, determined that 50 major
European retailers accounted for two thirds of total turnover in the sector in 1995.  The ten leading firms
are dominated by German and French chain store companies.  The German Metro Group is the
unchallenged leader in Europe followed by Rewe.  Recently, Rewe has obtained the market leadership
in Austria=s food retail sector by taking over the Billa chain.  Other examples of international
concentration in the food retail sector are the majority acquisition of Intermarché by the German Spar
group, the merger of Auchan and La Rinascente, and in cash and carry wholesaling Metro=s complete
taking-over of the Makro C&C Markets from the Dutch SVH holding (Wendt, 1997).  An example of
an American commitment in Germany is Wal-Mart=s take-over of Wertkauf (Vongehr, 1997). 
According to Eurodata, there are striking differences in the concentration levels between national
markets.  The top five food retailers (highest turnover) in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Austria, which
have the highest concentration levels, hold over 80% of the market.  Countries where the top five hold5
more than two-thirds of the market are Luxembourg, Denmark, Belgium and Portugal.  In Switzerland,
Germany, France,  Spain, and the Netherlands, the market share of the five major firms is less than two
thirds.   Low concentration levels are recorded for Hungary, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, Poland, and the
Czech Republic (Gordian, 1996).
The traditional American supermarket is threatened by new competitors.  An FMI study shows
that in 1994, American supermarkets lost a total turnover of more than US$23B to alternative retail
operations such as supercenters, warehouse clubs, and discounters.  Thorough changes for the British
retail industry are also expected.  Increasing competitive pressure from discounters as well as planning
restrictions for new stores on "green fields" outside of cities force traditional supermarket operators to
look for new concepts.
Reasons for international concentration:
(a) The abolition of borders, the establishment of a common market, and the introduction of a single
currency facilitate the free movement of goods and capital within the European Union.
(b) The opening of Eastern European markets and the improvement of the economic situation in those
countries bring about opportunities and development prospects for retail trade.
( c) Consumer behavior in Europe is becoming increasingly similar.  An example is the discount market,
which "conquered" Europe starting from Germany and is now popular even in Italy.
(d) Retailers from countries with highly competitive markets see the opportunity to relocate to less
competitive markets where higher returns can be achieved.
(e) Internationalization in food retailing is a response to the international concentration process in food
manufacturing.  Securing a strong position in the retail market and thus buying power with food
producers has become an essential impulse for expansion.
(f) Domestic expansion is limited for large food retailers because of already high market shares.  The
only way to expand is to eliminate competitors.  Diversification is another option for growth, but foreign
expansion seems to be a more profitable alternative.
(g) Potential foreign profits of competitors could be invested at home in one=s domestic business - a6
threat that prompts most of the larger food retailers to become active in foreign markets.
Buying Power of Food Retailers
What characterizes a company capable of mastering the present market situation in the food
retail sector? The top 20 retailers obtain far more than two thirds of the total turnover in the institutional
grocery trade and each of them is so big and has so much influence that no manufacturer can disregard
them.  It has not always been like this and food manufacturers were able to manage things as they liked.
 With the rise of discounters, hypermarkets, self-service department stores and the creation of
increasingly large wholesale and retail units the influence of the food manufacturing sector declined.  The
grocery market was newly divided: brand names disappeared, new brands emerged, and old ties broke
apart (Schellenberger, 1994).
Food manufacturers feel the buying power of retailers in many ways.  The terms of trade have
changed to the advantage of retailers who exercise pressure on prices and conditions with the threat not
to sell the products of particular suppliers.  Retailers may also threaten to reduce their orders or to
exclude all or some products of a supplier from sale promotions.  Retailers and suppliers negotiate the
terms of trade individually.  Delivery contracts are the result of voluntary concessions made by the
supplier as well as the importance and negotiation skills of the retailer.  Besides gross price rebates,
supply contracts may include cash discounts, grace periods, agreements on the distribution of transport
costs and risks, as well as various side payments and other services including entrance and listing fees,
shelf and shop window rents, advertising contributions, merchandising, and price-marking carried out by
suppliers.  Buying power is not only a problem for the vertical relation of suppliers and retailers but also
a Ademand-led discrimination against weak competitorsA (Lenel, 1997).
The effect of the concentration process on the competitive situation in the food retail sector is
controversial.  In 1996, the German Antitrust Commission took the view that there is no Adecline in the
intensity of competitionA and attempts made by retailers to improve their market position by taking over
other firms or through more favorable supply conditions are Aequalized regularly and comparatively fast
through competitive response" (Kaas, 1994).  The most important result of competition in the food retail7
sector is certainly a cheaper and improved consumer supply.  The German Antitrust Commission sees
the growth of the major firms as Aimproving a company=s position in relation to their suppliers and
enhancing its market significance in local markets.A However, the increased concentration does not
necessarily improve the supply to consumers, and may exploit food manufacturers, eliminate
competitors and increase the economic power of the remaining companies.
Outlet Types
The concentration process in the German grocery retail sector occurring at the cost of small
stores with less than 400 m
2 (4,300 sq. feet) of selling area will continue, especially when taking into
account the low levels of economic growth, the high unemployment, and the austerity measures resulting
in declining purchasing power.  The Nielsen index for the food retail sector showed a 2.7% decline in
the number of stores, with an even bigger decline in the number of small stores.  The decline of self-
service chain stores in Germany is also continuing.  In January 1997, 63,511 stores were counted - a
decrease of 376 stores or 0.6% compared to a year earlier.8
Table 2: Outlet Types in the German Food Retail Sector
Outlet Type Selling Area Product Assortment
Self-Service Store < 200 m
2 (2,150 sq. ft.) Groceries Only
Self-Service Market 200 B 400 m
2 Groceries, Fresh Food and Non-food
Supermarket > 400 m
2 (4,300 sq. ft.) Fresh Food (Non-food area <20%)
Discounter n.a. High Volume Items only
Consumer Market > 1500 m
2 (16,150 sq. ft.) Groceries and Non-food
Self Service Dept. Store > 5000 m
2 (53,750 sq. ft.) Groceries and Non-food
Cash and Carry Market n.a. Food and Non-food Items for Resale
 Source:  Günther (1997)
The average selling area is 314 m
2 (3,380 sq. ft.) for a self-service market, 495 m
2 (5,330 sq.
ft.) for a discounter, 921 m
2  (9,915 sq. ft.) for a supermarket, 3258 m
2 (35,072 sq. ft.) for a consumer
market, and 6581 m
2 (70,844 sq. ft.) for a self-service department store.  Note that a consumer market
is a large supermarket where the non-food area typically exceeds 20% of the selling area.  Obviously,
parallel to the store size, the annual turnover increases from about DM 3.9M ($2.6M) for self-service
markets to about DM 59.7M ($39.9M) for the department stores.  On average, there are 10.6 full-time
employees in a self-service market and 78.6 full-time employees in a self-service department store. 
Thus, there is one full-time employee for 30 m
2 (323 sq. ft.) of selling area in small self-service markets.
 In self-service department stores, this number is about three times as large (one full-time employee for
87 m
2 or 937 sq. ft.).
Comparing an average self-service market to an average self-service department store, the
selling area increases 21-fold, the turnover 15-fold, but the number of employees only 7-fold.  On
average, a self-service market counts 635 customers (transactions) per working day, while a self-
service department store counts 3,306 customers or five times as many.  The average purchase per
customer is DM 20.80 ($13.90) for a self-service market and DM 60.20 ($40.33) for a self-service
department store, which is explained by the wider assortment of non-food items.  For the different outlet
types, the number of customers and the average purchase per customer increases, but the ratio of
customers per square feet of selling area decreases with the store size (Groner, 1996).9
Performance and Costs
Space Performance and Space Costs
Space performance measures the gross turnover per square foot of selling area and is one of the
most important performance ratios in retailing, allowing for a quick and useful evaluation of a store.  Due
to the Aself-service principle,@ the space performance measure typically declines for the larger retail
units.  Total space costs in relation to gross turnover vary between 4.2% and 5.9% for the different
outlet types listed in Table 2.  The value for consumer markets and supermarkets are the highest and for
discounters are the lowest.  The rent paid per square foot of selling area depends to a large extent on
the location of a particular outlet type.
Staff Performance and Staff Costs
Annual turnover per full-time employee is a measure of staff performance.  On average, it is
about DM 363,200 (or $243,344) for self-service markets.  The staff performance measure increases
for supermarkets, consumer markets and discounters up to about DM 759,500 (or $508,865) for self-
service department stores.  Depending on the outlet type, the staff performance typically increases with
the size of a store. 
Staff costs (on a full-time basis) range from DM 45,500 - 53,900 ($30,485 - 36,113) per year
and are similar for the different outlet types.  Gross salaries, wages, paid premiums, and employer
contributions to statutory social security are the basis for calculating staff costs.  The measure Astaff cost
as a percentage of annual turnover@ is used to compare personnel costs for the different outlet types.  It
decreases for the larger outlet types in the food retail sector.  The figure is about 13.5% for self-service
markets, and declines to about 8.1% for self-service department stores.  The staff costs for discounters,
however, are by far the lowest (only 6.6% of annual turnover).10
Checkout Performance
The average number of checkout stands is 2.6 for self-service markets, 2.8 for discounters, 4.2
for supermarkets, 9.6 for consumer markets, and 15.6 for self-service department stores.  The ratio
Aselling area per checkout@ is important to evaluate checkout performance.  In larger stores, more selling
area per checkout stand is covered.  The number of necessary checkouts stands in a store depends on
outlet type, selling area, store location which in turn influences customer frequency.  The number of
customers covered by a checkout stand depends on the product assortment and differs between outlet
types.  The ratio Acustomers per checkout stand per yearA is about 84,600 for the small self-service
markets and about 63,600 for the big self-service department stores.
Since the Aaverage purchase per transaction@ increases faster for the larger retail outlets than the
Acustomers per checkout stand per yearA decreases, the Aturnover per checkout standA increases with
the selling area of the different outlet types.  Thus, a checkout stand in a small self-service market can
cover a volume of nearly DM 1.2M ($804,000), but more than three times as much (DM 3.8M or
$2.55M) in a large self-service department store.
Inventory Turnover
Inventory is particularly relevant in business management, because it locks up capital, thus
causing capital costs.  For self-service department stores, the Ainventory per square foot of selling areaA
is about twice as large as for discounters (DM 1,138 or $762 vs. DM 558 or $374).  For discounters,
the average frequency of inventory turnover is the highest (about 16 times per year) and for self-service
department stores, it is the lowest (about 6.7 times per year).  The measure declines the larger the
selling area and the more non-food items are sold in the store.  Accordingly, outlet types with a higher
frequency of inventory turnover have shorter storage periods.  Discounters store their assortment for
only 23 days on average, supermarkets for 30 days, while self-service department stores keep it for 55
days before selling it.11
Total Costs
Total direct costs of running a branch store relative to its gross turnover are the lowest for
discounters (13.6%).  Self-service department stores follow with 19%, consumer markets with 19.5%,
supermarkets with 19.7%, and self-service markets with 21.8%.  The main cost categories are labor
and space costs which alone cover 86% of total costs for self-service markets, but only 68% for self-
service department stores.
With the exception of discounters, the share of staff costs relative to turnover declines for the
larger outlet types.  The measure equals about 13.5% for self-service markets, 8.1% for self-service
department stores, and only 6.6% for discounters.  Shares of space costs relative to turnover are not
homogeneous across outlet types.  The figure ranges from about 4% for small self-service markets to
about 6% for smaller consumer markets (<2,500 m
2 [26,912 sq. ft.]) of selling area (Groner, 1996).
Efficient Consumer Response (ECR)
Introduction
In Germany, the relation between retailer and manufacturer is characterized by distrust and a
struggle over the terms of trade.  However, the concept of ECR is based on cooperation between
retailers and manufacturers.  The term AEfficient Consumer Response@ is not easy to grasp.  The
definition of the Food Marketing Institute (1994) is as follows:
The definition indicates that ECR was initiated in grocery retailing.  However, today it applies to the
entire consumer goods industry and is defined more generally (von der Heydt, 1997):
ECR is a grocery industry strategy in which retailers, wholesalers, brokers and
suppliers work more closely together to bring better value to the consumer.12
Although both definitions may appear rather vague, they express the key elements of ECR. 
According to the principle Acooperation not confrontation,@ the consumer is the starting and reference
point for joint activities between food manufacturers and retailers.  Cooperation between manufacturers
and retailers is best described by an excerpt from the legendary Coca-Cola study:  ACooperation
between industry and retailing is characterized through the exchange of sensitive internal and/or external
information and data and by common processes and procedures in decision-making, clearly aiming at
mutually benefiting from the resulting advantages.@ (Coca-Cola Retailing Research Group, 1994). 
However, not only retailers are facing the challenge of developing complete and innovative solutions
when confronted with problems within complex markets and legal structures.  Solutions aim at potentials
along the entire marketing chain and cannot be achieved at the product or company level alone(Günther,
1997).
Starting Situation for ECR
Witte (1997) characterizes the demand side in highly-developed economies by:
ECR is a company vision and strategy based on a trusting partnership and cooperation
between manufacturers and retailers, focusing elaborate techniques designed to remove
inefficiencies along the marketing chain, taking into account consumer needs and maximum
customer satisfaction, to create mutual benefits for each party involved which otherwise
cannot be achieved.
no or low population growth         stagnant real disposable income
less traditional household characteristics            increasing average age
increased use of fast information gathering     changing consumer habits
consumers want more value for less money changed price/value relations13
Affected by retailers and consumers, the supply side exhibits (Kroger, 1997):
Due to competitive dynamics, the marketing chain becomes increasingly linked and more complex
(Heinemann, 1997).  According to Witte (1997) significant factors are:
The following trends characterize highly-developed countries at the retail level (Witte, 1997):
Against this background, ECR is often mentioned as a solution for both manufacturers and
retailers.  However, ECR is more than reengineering logistics and cost-cutting.  The right way to apply
ECR is to use the cost reductions achieved to promote growth.  ECR calls on retailers and
manufacturers to put consumer needs in first place and to meet them as efficiently as possible.  ECR
means that the entire marketing chain from the supplier of raw material to the manufacturer, the retailer





increasing demands of the trading firms
increasing demands of the consumers
pressure on prices/costs/margins
•  an increasingly  heterogeneous consumer market where standard marketing tools may not
affect preferences and brand loyalty.  Polarization and fragmentation as well as high price
sensitivity requires fast, flexible, minimum cost reactions to the changing consumer needs,
•  a constantly growing product variety due to consumer market heterogeneity,
•  legal provisions  (e.g. packaging laws) imposing additional restrictions at strategic and
operational levels,
•  the fusion of retail markets which have lost their regional character.  More foreign suppliers
enter the German market.  Direct deliveries are replaced by a distribution system via central
warehouses with new demands on the logistics management,
•  technological development towards automation and networking as a prerequisite for
organizational and marketing concepts of the future.
         stagnant or declining consumer spending excess retail capacity
         growing pressure on prices/costs/margins intense competition
         growing buying power of retailers increased presence of discounters
         significance of brand names more information about consumers14
signal to production.  Insufficient production estimates, costly administration, and intermediate storage
are eliminated.  However, the optimization of the supply chain cannot be attained by individual action. 
An open cooperation based on partnership is necessary if the parties involved want to achieve optimal
cost reductions and growth.  Three essential concepts to achieve these goals are linked with ECR
(Kroger, 1997):
Efficiency aims at optimal resource use for the whole supply chain.  The performance of resource
inputs is analyzed and optimized.  Every activity is to be executed at minimum cost.
Consumer orientation is to raise consumer satisfaction and loyalty.  Requirements for the production
process regarding costs, quality and time are established together with the customers (the
beneficiaries of the activities).
Responsiveness is to satisfy consumer needs on time stressing the increasing importance of time in
competition: performance has to be accomplished in shorter periods, at minimum costs and tailored
to the needs of the market.
ECR involves a consumer oriented examination of processes to develop cooperation strategies between
manufacturers and retailers.  In doing so, ECR is based on four strategic areas optimizing the flow of
information and goods over the entire supply chain.  Necessary information is made available in a
precise way and on time to ensure a regular and smooth flow of goods suiting the needs of the market. 
An information network and a continuous data exchange via Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) promote
an up-to-date preparation of production and management processes so that supply gaps can be
avoided and administration costs are reduced to a minimum level.  The use of information technology
appropriate for the respective process is used in order to be efficient.  Extensive standardization and
networking of information exhaust performance potentials for the physical flow of goods.
1. Efficiency          2. Consumer Orientation          3. Responsiveness15
Strategic Elements of ECR
Efficient replenishment (ER) is cooperation in operational logistics and information
technology to make the right product available in the right quantity at the right time and place.  Actual
point of sale (POS) data are gathered via checkout scanners and then analyzed.  Orders are
automatically transmitted to the manufacturer and executed.  The flow of information and goods is
optimized, eliminating unnecessary storage (e.g. via cross-docking: arrival of delivery trucks in a central
warehouse almost at the same time, avoiding intermediate storage).  Thus, the logistics system is
regulated by the final consumer (pull).   Important benefits of ER are fewer Aout-of-stock@ situations,
lower inventory requirements, more efficient use of shipping trucks, improved storage operation, a
reduction in unsold goods, and fewer consumer returns and complaints.
A key challenge to ECR results from uncertain demand conditions.  Inventory is a costly form of
insurance against these uncertainties.  The bullwhip effect is an important phenomenon in this context:
fluctuations in demand increase from the retailer to the wholesaler, the producer and the supplier of raw
materials, without fundamental fluctuations in the final consumer demand.  It is caused by obsolete
demand forecasts, fluctuating product prices and order sizes too large, i.e. by the fact that the partners
in the supply chain do not see the bigger picture.  The bullwhip effect can be fought by the joint planning
of price, transport and storage (Jammernegg, 1996).  Furthermore, it is possible to reduce fixed order
costs using EDI.  Outsourcing to a logistics service provider serving several companies en route saves
fixed transport costs.  However, the prerequisite is that current POS data are available to every partner
in the supply chain.
Efficient Assortment aims to optimize the assortment in a store which is affected by conflicting
interests between retailers and manufacturers.  Retailers want the highest possible return on their whole
assortment while manufacturers want to place their own products in an optimal way.  Essential to
achieving efficient assortment is successful Category Management.  From a consumer point of view, all
products are divided into different categories which are managed as independent business units (profit
centers).  ECR increasingly focuses on Category Management.  Key tasks of Category Managers are16
efficient product development, introduction and promotion.  Category managers need information about
all factors influencing the assortment.  Geared toward regional purchasing patterns and different
customer structures, assortment categories are examined and positioned in the market.  Using POS
data, the available shelf space is optimized.  The result is increased customer satisfaction and a higher
turnover.
Efficient Promotion aims to increase the efficiency of sales promotion.  POS data are used to
determine the consumers= reaction to promotion measures.  The conclusions reached help to choose the
optimal products for price reductions as well as their optimal markup.  Another strategy is every-day-
low-pricing (EDLP): all promotion activities and quantity discounts on the manufacturer and retail side
are eliminated.  EDLP leads to cost reductions in logistics, ordering, and in the sales department, which
can be passed on to the final consumer.  In the end, ECR may lead to a replacement of special offers
with every-day-low prices (Tietz, 1995).
Efficient Product Introduction facilitates the process of new product introductions.  It is
based on the exchange of POS data, market research findings, and information on consumers
preferences and habits to develop promising designs, to test the new product, to determine the optimal
price, to develop an appropriate promotion strategy, to identify a suitable place on the shelf, and to 
implement necessary adaptations in logistics.  Close cooperation between retailers and manufacturers
reduces the cost and raises the quality and acceptance of new products.
ECR Europe
Linking information systems and the exchange of sensitive information is a (culturally)
complicated issue that applies in particular to food retailers and manufacturers.  In recent years, mutual
distrust between prospective ECR partners has become widespread.  The result is constant suspicion
when a cooperative offer is made.  In order to approach matters without prejudice, the organization,
ECR Europe, was established with equal representation of retailers and manufacturers.  The goal is to
foster dialog between the parties and to promote feasible solutions. 
Table 3: Members of ECR Europe17
Manufacturers Coca-Cola, Johnson & Johnson, Kraft Jacobs Suchard, Mars, Nestlé, Procter &
Gamble, Sardus, Unilever
Retailers Albert Heijn, Auchan, ICA, Metro, Promodès, Rewe, Tesco, La Rinascente,
Safeway
Cost Reduction Potential
Partnerships in the marketing and supply chain are just at the beginning, but their potential is
enormous.  In the US, the cost reduction potential is about 10.8% of turnover in consumer prices (Kurt
Salomon Associates, 1993).  In Europe, the cost reduction potential is about 2.3 - 3.4% of turnover in
consumer prices, of which logistics account for 1.5 - 2.5% and marketing for 0.8 - 0.9%.  In Germany,
the potential is 3.5% of turnover through ECR (Coca-Cola Retailing Research Group, 1995).
ECR Europe concludes that the operational costs in the supply chain of the grocery sector could
be reduced by about US$27B per year.  Inventories could be reduced by over 40%.  Together, this
would constitute a cost reduction potential of 5.7% or US$33B.  Moreover, ECR Europe estimates
that the cost of the logistics chain could be lowered to a level of about 7.5% of turnover.  In light of the
narrow margins in the sector, it would seem appropriate for the industry to cooperate and exhaust cost
reduction potentials.  In this context, five fundamental issues arise:
1.  Who will achieve the gains?
2.  How large are the gains?
3.  When are the gains noticeable?
4.  How are the gains achieved?
5.  How are the gains distributed?
No matter how much emphasis is placed on cooperation, there will be distributive battles over the gains
from ECR.  Their result will depend on the relative strength of ECR partners.  Taking this into account,
estimates conclude that between 50 and 70% of the gains will go to retailers.  However, according to an
industry survey in the US, 36% of those asked acknowledge benefits for manufacturers, 24% benefits
for retailers, and only 8% of those asked see benefits for consumers.  Until now, comprehensive ECR
structures have not been implemented in Continental Europe.  The first projects are getting started, but18
they are not more than tests.  Thus, it is still too early to comment on how actual gains are achieved
and/or distributed.
Differences between Germany and the US
Repeatedly it is argued that ECR in Germany lags behind relative to other countries.  We
examine this argument in detail using objective and subjective criteria regarding the current situation. 
Nine theses are formulated with reference to an article entitled AWal-Mart Myth Leads to the Wrong
Positioning of ECR@ (Hallier, 1997).
Thesis 1:  Compared to Germany, the logistics chain is considerably longer in the US, where more than
half of the grocery sales are handled by wholesalers and brokers.  On average, the length of stay in the
distribution chain is 100 days per item in the US, but only 50 days in Germany.  That explains why
potential cost reductions due to ECR are higher in the US.  However, actual cost reductions in the US
have been lower than predicted by experts.
Thesis 2: ECR is often misinterpreted, in part due to the Wal-Mart Myth.  However, it is wrong to
explain Wal-Mart=s success through ECR alone as other factors such as location policy, employee
profit-sharing schemes, and a spirit towards innovation and technology are equally important. 
Moreover, the Wal-Mart myth leads many to believe that only certain elements of ECR must be
implemented to eliminate all business and retail management related problems.  ECR is not a secret
recipe, but must be tailored to the procedures of the supply chain and to specific structures within a
company.  What is right for one company may be wrong for another.
Thesis 3:  Procedural differences exist.  In Germany annual contracts are dominant, while in the US
business is mostly done Adeal by deal.@ Moreover, the average number of items in a supermarket is
more than 30,000 in the US - in Germany this number is less than 10,000.
Thesis 4:  In the US, the more prevalent use of scanners, which started earlier than in Germany, has led
to ample experience with consumer data.  Moreover, US rebate regulations, which allow discounts for
particular customers, further promote consumer loyalty schemes.  In Germany, retailers cannot grant19
good customers other bonuses than casual customers.
Thesis 5:  Cultural differences are another impeding factor.  Germans strive for perfection while Anglo-
Saxons have a Atrial and error@ mentality.  Too often Germans continue to discuss theories of failure and
success, when companies in other countries put practical implementation to the test.
Thesis 6:  In Europe, priority within ECR is given to EDI and Efficient Replenishment, but neither is
pursued much in Germany.  In Britian, outsourcing to a logistics service provider is an established
strategy to save transport costs.  It seems that for strategic reasons, German retailers are reluctant to
take similar steps, but initial advances are seen (e.g.  cross-docking for sale items).
Thesis 7: With respect to efficient supply channels, German discounters can stand any international
comparison.  This is not possible without excellent organizational skills, among other things.  Instead of
increasing profits, cost savings due to rationalization measures are passed on directly to German
consumers in an effort to raise market shares.  Focusing on the consumer, one might argue that this
actually is consumer-friendly behavior, as opposed to a strict focus on marketing efforts which raise the
profits of retailers and the food industry.
Thesis 8:  Large cost reductions are only achieved, if a critical mass is achieved.  As long as pioneer
initiatives induce new costs, the mutual benefits for retailers and manufacturers are small.  This is the fate
for a number of pilot projects and one reason why ECR is only used by a handful of key companies in
the market.  In the current competitive situation in Germany, many small and medium-sized companies
cannot afford investments in ECR initiatives for possible returns in the future.  Financing initiatives for
pilot projects may then be a way to foster the progress of ECR.
Thesis 9:  In Germany, the time for a strategic reorientation has come.  In the past decade, the focus
has been on the necessary adjustments due to reunification and market potentials in Eastern Europe. 
Financial and human resources have primarily been used for acquisitions and securing new locations. 
On the other hand, in the US the priority has been to optimize the supply chain.20
Risks and Barriers
ECR involves dependency risks.  Dependence on particular suppliers or on the performance of
Category Managers is due to the structural changes implied by ECR.  A lack of buffer stocks increases
the risk in the event of a strike.  Orientation and adaptation of Category Management to a particular
supplier can lead to incompatibilities with other suppliers.  ECR also may provoke negative reactions on
the consumer side because of more transparency.  Category Management would require that sales data
combined with credit/debit card information be made available.  This will not be welcomed by all
consumers and may face legal challenges.
In Germany, ECR initiatives often face criticism and distrust.  Implementation problems are
related to retail trade (e.g. dissent on the distribution of cost reductions, previous conflicts,
organizational structure, lack of trust, misuse of data) and the manufacturer (e.g. lack of know-how,
management support, information technology and other resources).  Technological barriers may exist as
the flow of paper records must be substituted by electronic data interchange (EDI).  However, the main
problem is the change needed in the way of thinking and not so much the adaptation of information
systems and reorganization.  Thus, the following basic prerequisites for a successful ECR cooperation
between retailers and manufacturers are necessary:
•  personal commitment and involvement of the top management
•  launching of training programs for the employees
•  launching of pilot schemes with partners
•  multifunctional action teams.
Cost reductions and growth will ensue only if retailers and manufacturers start a step-by-step
partnership and rapidly work toward a critical mass.  Potential cost reductions of 5-6% and growth
prospects of 5% should encourage the parties involved to be proactive on ECR.
Conditions for Success
An ECR offensive may not be successful by definition.  We examine five prerequisites for the
success of ECR (from a retailers point of view):
1.  ECR is firm specific.  It promotes price discounting as a way to attain market leadership.  Concepts21
that focus on improving markups and include additional services (e.g. depth of product range or
shopping atmosphere) in their price calculations, will not be very successful with ECR.
2.  The distribution of cost reductions through ECR remains a question of power. Only equal positions
of power between retailers and manufacturers will secure win/win-situations.
3.  ECR can only be applied to demand-oriented assortments and assumes a Apermanent flowA of items
with synchronous production.  A Aseasonal flowA (e.g. Christmas items) inadvertently results in supply
bottlenecks, because ECR allows no demand buffers.
4.  ECR can be applied selectively to declining food and growing nonfood assortments.  ECR measures
should be examined for each supplier and each assortment.
5.  ECR must be examined against the background of specific company strategies.  ECR always leads
to a restructuring process.  It requires standardized and centralized trading concepts and a critical
examination of ECR is necessary if differentiated and decentralized structures exist.
These arguments show that ECR is not necessarily successful.  Nevertheless, every trading firm
should consider ECR.  The Wal-Mart example shows that it holds enormous possibilities for trade. 
ECR should not be an end in itself or a matter of prestige.  Moreover, it can in fact also be of advantage
to trading firms when applied selectively.
Conclusion
ECR is based on a particular philosophy or attitude, and with intensifying competition it provides
a catalog of measures to achieve more efficiency and customer focus.  However, implementation
problems are enormous and developing a culture of cooperation is difficult.  Conflicting goals, a lack
of trust, high investments costs and unilateral initiatives make ideal win-win situations often appear pure
theory.
At the moment, ECR is often a line-up of individual activities rather than an integrated overall
plan.  However, no company can afford to ignore ECR in the long run and nearly all German retailers
are implementing aspects of it or plan to do so in the near future (Homburg, 1997).  However, the22
implementation process is slow and difficult because distrust between retailers and manufacturers is
deeply rooted and a big obstacle for ECR.   Nevertheless, continued efforts on both sides including the
digitalization of trade will advance ECR because cooperation is always better than confrontation.
Prognosis
Food Manufacturing Sector
    Only those companies that react flexibly to changing markets and trends and place innovative
products in expanding market segments are likely to be successful.  Determining factors for the future
development of the German food manufacturing sector are (Breitenacher, 1996):
• Bleak domestic growth prospects as many regional markets are saturated.  Growth potentials only
for high-quality, or trend products (reflecting dietary, health, and environmental concerns).
• Confrontation with problems of pollution control and health protection.
• Geographical proximity to the East European food industry with low-cost labor that could soon turn
into serious competition.
• Increasingly global competition and more concentration in the food retail sector will further increase
the intensity of competition.
• New prospects for exports and more competition from abroad (primarily affecting medium-sized
companies competing with global players) due to GATT agreements.
German food manufacturers will need to follow adaptation requirements in the years to come in order to
remain sufficiently competitive (Geyer, 1997):
• To focus on high-quality products and foreign markets that promise growth,
• To achieve more brand loyalty in the German market through communication campaigns in order to
prompt powerful retailers to sell their products,
• To pursue systematic and strict cost management at all company levels (e.g. concentrate the
manufacturing of particular products at a few Eastern European locations, transfer logistics and sales
activity to trading firms or specialized service providers, mergers or amalgamations of production
facilities in particular product categories to increase productivity).23
Food Retail Sector
A.C. Nielsen (1997) forecasts that the number of stores will continue to go down while sales
growth rates stay at low levels.  In 2005, about 60,000 stores will achieve a turnover of DM 254 B (or
$147 B).  From 1998 - 2005, the annual sales growth will range between 1 and 2% which will further
increase concentration.  With respect to outlet types, discounters will further strengthen their position. 
The small grocery shop in the neighborhood with 200 to 400 m
2 (2,150 - 4,300 sq. ft.) of selling area
will continue to exist on the personal commitment of the shopkeepers.  Retail groups such as Rewe or
Edeka will present their offers on the Internet.  Customers can click and order goods which are then
delivered to their home.  Subsidiary branches of chain stores with limited staff will suffer losses as they
cannot finance an order and delivery service.  A supermarket with 400 to 1,000 m
2 (4,300 - 10,750 sq.
ft.) of selling area and a dedicated shopkeeper can survive with a good parking situation.  Consumer
markets with 1,000 to 2,000 m
2 (10,750 - 21,500 sq. ft.) of selling area will suffer losses due to their
lack of proximity to customers and their limited assortment.  Order supermarkets will be established
where goods can be collected or delivered directly to the customer.  Discounters will not benefit from
online shopping.  When orders are processed via data network and additional order picking staff is
required, their low prices cannot be maintained.
In 2005, the food retail sector will be dominated by large-space stores and discounters including
Aldi, potentially commanding over 75% of total turnover.  The share of supermarkets and smaller stores
will be less than 24% (in 1995 this was still 30%).  A.C. Nielsen's market research concludes that "... 
concerning the large-space stores and the discounters, the concentration in the grocery retailing sector
will continue - also due to the change in store opening hours."24
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